The Face and the Possibility of an Ethics of Performance by Erickson, Jon
Spring 1999 5 
The Face and the Possibility of an Ethics of Performance 
Jon Erickson 
The following is the first stage of an investigation into the phenomenology 
of theatre and its relation to the question of what an ethics of performance might 
constitute.1 This is not done to impose some kind of theoretical prescription on 
what performance should be and do, but is rather an examination of what it already 
does, and has done, and no doubt will continue to do, as a questioning reflection 
of interpersonal accountability within human society, between both individuals and 
groups. I wish to examine two theoretical perspectives that have some important 
consequences for this issue. In the process I will test these theories against two 
works of theater, Samuel Beckett's Catastrophe and Ntozake Shange's Spell #7. 
What compels me to use these two works beyond the easily discernible relevance 
of the philosophical concepts addressed here, is that each in their own way are 
themselves theories of the ethical relation in performance. That is, in each the 
presumed "content" of the plays determines—or is determined by—the formal self-
consciousness of the context, the site itself, of performance. 
This investigation emerges from two seemingly different impulses. One 
comes from my experience of teaching art students who work in intermedia 
forms—such as performance, installation, conceptual, and computer art—who are 
in general allergic to most critical theory, but who have found the work of Deleuze 
and Guattari, especially their book A Thousand Plateaus, to be highly suggestive, 
if not inspirational, for the creation of art works.2 Whether or not they understand 
the overall context and sense of their theory, Deleuze and Guattari's 
imagery—rhizomes, nomads, war machines, bodies without organs, stratifications, 
smooth space, and the like—seem to connect intuitively with students's impulses 
in a time when humanity is radically reconceiving itself and its environment. But 
beyond its purely libidinal investments as an "aesthetics of existence" (Foucault), 
this process of continual fluid redefinition has a crucial bearing on what it means 
to have agency and also be held accountable for one's actions toward others, which 
is the fundamental ethical issue at the heart of all political relations to justice, if 
politics is not simply to be conceived of as a continual state of war of all against all. 
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The second impulse comes from a different quarter: a long-standing 
interest in deconstruction, both in terms of what I see as a powerful theory of not 
only language but cognition, which people often decry or attempt to ignore, but 
seldom really argue with, and as a problematic philosophy when it comes to 
questions of politics, ethics or justice. Research I've done in regard to questions 
of ethical choices vis à vis deconstruction has tended to point past Derrida to one 
of his mentors, the philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas. In contrast to Deleuze and 
Guattari, who construct a decidedly antihumanist, and even what is called "post-
human," doctrine, Lévinas appears relatively humanist in his approach. But if we 
are to speak coherently about a "politics of performance" that makes sense, we 
have to examine both sides of this theoretical divide and relate them to the question 
of human interaction, in which performance operates at every point of contact. My 
performance here focuses on the human face as the point of theoretical contact 
between Lévinas and Deleuze and Guattari. While my desire to raise questions 
about an ethics of performance is largely indebted to Lévinas's conception of the 
face-to-face encounter, Deleuze and Guattari's own concept of what the face is and 
does represents the most extreme counter-position to it, reflecting the presumably 
political maneuvers of identity-evaders in a flight from subjectivity and its 
production by signifying systems. 
We can indicate the position of Deleuze and Guattari regarding the face 
if we think of what their writings are reacting to overall. The major figure of 
opposition is Hegel, and the conventional vision of his synthesizing and totalizing 
dialectic.3 Deleuze and Guattari's opposition to dialectics in general lead them to 
oppose what they see as the "biunivocal" totalizing aspects of signification as it 
developed out of Saussure. Following Foucault, they are opposed to the "subject" 
production of discursive institutions, what they call "subjectivation." What they 
wish to affirm is any evasion of these mechanisms through processes of becoming 
which make no distinctions between the subject/verb or subject/object relations that 
are built into the "overcodings" of despotic signifying systems. They oppose Freud 
because of the despotic Oedipal relation, and Lacan because he has done the most 
to connect the concept of the subject to the signifier, and so to a system of 
signifying desire based on lack, which leads the subject along the continually 
frustrating chain of signification. Their writings are a reaction to systems which 
redundantly reflect or repeat extant significations through the process of 
interpretation. Instead they posit an idea of experimentation instead of 
interpretation—no repetition, no representation, no signification, but always a 
becoming something else. For them signification and subjectivation are two 
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strategies of social and state power over bodies continually trying to evade 
definition. 
In their chapter "Year Zero: Faciality," from A Thousand Plateaus, 
Deleuze and Guattari indicate how the 
face is produced only when the head ceases to be a part of the 
body, when it ceases to be coded by the body, when it ceases to 
have a multidimensional, polyvocal corporeal code—when the 
body, head included, has been decoded and has to be overcoded 
by something we shall call the Face. (170) 
In this process the head becomes "facialized" by what they read as the abstract 
machine producing faciality—the "screen with holes, the white wall/black hole." 
They indicate that the body will also become facialized. What's more, they 
indicate that the face has been projected onto the external environment, like 
architecture and landscapes (one can extrapolate this even further into the 
traditional theater or film situation). In a move that carries a tinge of Rousseauist 
exoticism, they also wish to distinguish Western power, which requires the 
production of a face, from primitive societies which do not. "In primitive societies 
we see that there is very little that operates through the face: their semiotic is 
nonsignifying, nonsubjective, essentially collective, polyvocal and corporeal," 
operating essentially through their bodies ( 175). "Primitives," they say, "may have 
the most human of heads, the most beautiful and most spiritual, but they have no 
face and need none" (176). The face is not a universal, but instead is that of the 
White Man, and what's more, it's the face of Christ, who "invented the 
facialization of the entire body and spread it everywhere" (177). In the process, 
people of other races are "inscribed on the wall, distributed by the hole" of the 
faciality machine, "they must be Christianized, in other words, facialized." White 
racism, for Deleuze and Guattari, has never operated by exclusion, for "from the 
viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside" (178). 
The mask adumbrates the importance of the distinctions they are making: 
Either the mask assures the head's belonging to the body, its 
becoming-animal, as was the case in primitive societies. Or, as 
is the case now, the mask assures the erection, the construction 
of the face, the facialization of the head and the body. (181) 
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Deleuze and Guattari's agenda is to try to "destroy" and "dismantle" the face, 
placing it "on the road to the asignifying and asubjective" (171). But they admit 
this process is "no mean affair. Madness is a definite danger" (188). They admit 
the impossibility of "making ourselves a new primitive head and body, human, 
spiritual, and faceless," but that we have to work within and against the 
significations of the face: "Only across the wall of the signifier can you run lines 
of asignifiance that void all memory, all return, all possible signification and 
interpretation" (189). They end the chapter with a new possibility beyond the face, 
which they call "probe-heads," without specifying exactly what this is. But it 
conjures up impersonal worlds of electronic circuitry conjoined by an unmistakably 
phallocentric, if not phallocratie, image (191). 
In direct contrast to this position we have that of Emmanuel Lévinas 
elucidated in his books Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being.4 Lévinas 
is also operating against totalizing systems like Hegel's, but specifically against 
Heidegger's philosophy and the idea of an all-pervasive Totality as he sees it 
expressed in the concepts of Being and ontology. Instead Lévinas posits ethics as 
prior to Being, and that ethics is founded on what he calls the face-to-face relation, 
a relation of exteriority. In this relation the face of the Other compels one through 
its signifying of infinite need, and through this Other there is access to the idea of 
God. The face of the Other facing me compels my ongoing responsibility for the 
Other. Inasmuch as the face is an aspect of infinity and not totality, I cannot 
assume reciprocity in responsibility from the Other, I cannot expect anything in 
return. The relation is an entirely asymmetrical one. As such the face resists both 
objectification and totalization, even while the face is the condition of possibility 
for all signification through its "signifyingness." This signifyingness is similar to 
what Heidegger and Derrida call the Call, what Lacan calls the Demand and "true 
speech," and what Lévinas will go on to call the Saying as opposed to the Said. 
That is—in each of these terms one is not to find a particular signification, but 
rather a call to attention, a call to responsibility: a setting up of the conditions 
whereby communication is possible between two beings. This for Lévinas is the 
essence of the ethical relation, prior to any signification that can follow from it. 
What is important to Lévinas, in the infinite signifyingness of the face, is that "it 
never appears as a theme," but always only as the call to responsibility. He will 
also refer this to the distinction between the Prophetic as the call to responsibility 
and the Philosophic, which is the thematization of the Other, turning her into an It 
rather than encountering her as a Thou (to use Martin Buber's terms). The 
Prophetic pertains to the Saying, the Philosophic always to the Said. But always 
for Lévinas "The Other is neither initially nor ultimately what we grasp or what we 
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thematize" (77,172) For some there is something frightfully absolute in Lévinas' s 
ethical stance of being for the Other, even as he generally refers to the Other as the 
poor, the orphaned, the widowed, and so on. What if the Other is in a position of 
power? Lévinas counters this by saying that responsibility as something initially 
"for the Other . . . means that I am responsible for his very responsibility" (96). 
This is not so far from the positions of nonviolence posited by Gandhi and King in 
which the Other has to be convinced about what responsibility for their Other is, 
if one is to stop the endless cycle of violence. Lévinas develops the face-to-face 
ethical relation further by speaking of the "third party" which "looks at me in the 
eyes of the Other," so there are never simply two figures here. "The thou is posited 
in front of a we. The presence of the face, the infinity of the Other, is a 
destituteness, a presence of a third party (that is, of the whole of humanity which 
looks at us), and a command that commands commanding" (213). This third party 
moves the ethical relation into the political realm and constitutes the basis for 
justice. This relation to the third party indicates how one takes responsibility for 
the Other's responsibility as well. 
So we see the kind of direct opposition in political and ethical terms as 
pertaining to Lévinas and Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the face (although 
Deleuze and Guattari would never speak of ethics, only politics). Deleuze and 
Guattari refer to a State production of the face, turning it into a political 
signification, while John Llewelyn, in explicating Lévinas, claims: "The political 
renders the ethical invisible. The State effaces the face."5 (We will see how the 
latter is borne out in examining Beckett's play.) While one can spend a great deal 
of time just trying to argue philosophically between these two positions, the point 
here is to see what all this has to do with performance. 
Why an "ethics" of performance? Given that theories of the politics of 
performance have for so long thrived on notions of transgression, subversion, 
undermining of norms, shock value, and so forth, doesn't referring to a possible 
ethics immediately conjure up visions of repression, of orderliness, of codes, of 
limiting the freedom of the creative performative act? Yet one has to ask, in the 
service of what has transgression, subversion, undermining of norms operated? 
Hasn't it been in relation to questions of injustice, of racism, sexism, homophobia? 
Hasn't its goal in the long run been that of indicating the need for justice for those 
refused it either by majorities or minorities with power? Hasn't the communication 
of this sentiment, this situation, even while it may seek to thrive as a politics of 
difference, always been directed at those whose ethics can be appealed to, an 
appeal to include everyone consistently within their ethical universe? While people 
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have spoken so adamantly about politics in terms that are more redolent of warfare 
pure and simple, presumably they do so in order to more forcefully convince others 
of the justice and ethical significance of their position, or at least of their questions. 
But they can't really do this solely on the level of politics, if by politics is meant the 
pursuit of power for its own sake. Max Weber refers to politics as a system by 
which people attempt to share power.6 This is done through various means, but 
most specifically through forms of rhetorical persuasion (which don't preclude 
certain kinds of coercion) and promises. Politics is an instrumental means, 
hopefully a means toward creating a situation conducive to ethical relations, which 
are to be read as its end as well as its motivation—such as the ethics of freedom 
and equality. Ethics has to have priority in relation to politics, in both a temporal 
and evaluative sense, in order for those politics—as a means—to have meaning at 
all; in other words, ethics must exert its authority over politics as a means as well. 
Even the most cynical of politicians have to speak in the language of ethics, 
demonstrating that hypocrisy indeed is the homage vice pays to virtue. So in a 
sense "political" appeals made by artists in their work have always been at base 
ethical appeals. By designating them merely as "political" one establishes a 
polarized battleground, possibly alienating those who might be willing to 
contemplate a social problematic from an ethical standpoint.7 This isn't to say that 
creating performance to produce polarization doesn't have its own attractions, but 
they are in the longest run self-serving and self-defeating. 
Lévinas continually states the importance of the maintenance of separation 
between self and Other as essential for maintaining the ethical relation; in particular 
he marks the separation that prevents one from seeking reciprocity with the Other, 
which could at some point could easily dissolve into an illusion of the complete 
identification between the two parties. This separation, and this priority of being 
for the Other prevents action from becoming solipsistic, if not narcissistic. Ethics 
is always for the Other, politics as it has come to be understood doesn't need to be; 
this is why one can witness self-indulgent performances that at the same time call 
themselves "political" and seem to get away with it, largely because of a 
misconstrual of the original sense of what "the personal is the political" meant for 
feminism, for instance. Can one engage in performance that self-consciously 
considers itself an exploration of the ethics of performance, of consciously being 
for the other, and get away with posturing in this sense? 
Lévinas's propositions about being for the Other in a sense of infinite 
responsibility indicates that being responsible for the Other's responsibility must 
not devolve into mere self-serving attitudinalizing. I think at times of the sins that 
have been committed in Artaud's name, that is, all the self-indulgent fierceness and 
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shock-value in-your-face political and erotic righteousness projected by self-
satisfied scandalous performers. I think of Artaud because I think of his notion that 
a theatre of cruelty must be "cruel to myself first of all." The performer is there not 
to "teach" the audience a lesson, but to explore her own limits, to lay bare her own 
face before the others and before herself. If that experience was strong and clear 
enough, the more perspicuous members of the audience will understand and be 
provoked, disturbed, moved, challenged by it. But does the performer in all this 
give up the face-to-face relation, the responsibility to the Other as audience? Isn't 
the performer's responsibility in evoking that responsibility in the audience for 
herself as paradigmatic Other? 
Consider the end of Samuel Beckett's play Catastrophe, written for 
Vaclav Havel.8 The central figure is referred to as the Protagonist, standing 
midstage on a black block 18 inches high. He wears a "black wide-brimmed hat. 
Black dressing gown to ankles. Barefoot. Head bowed. Hands in pockets. Age 
and physique unimportant" (297). Throughout the play the Assistant follows the 
instructions of the Director in creating the most abject figure out of the Protagonist. 
She takes off P's hat, so D can see his skull, which "needs whitening." She asks 
if they should add a little gag, to make sure he won't speak. The Director indicates 
he won't make a squeak. From the house the Director complains that he can't see 
the toes of the bare feet, so the Assistant needs to raise the pedestal. The Director 
is upset that there is a "trace of face," so she should lower the head, even as the 
Director insists that the scene could do with more nudity (299). The Director then 
asks for a spotlight on the head, while the Assistant timidly asks if they could raise 
his head and show his face, just for an instant. The Director is dumbfounded and 
angry at this suggestion. He is satisfied with the spot on the lowered head. D asks 
for the lights to come up, then the general light to fade out and then the light on 
body to fade out, leaving the light on head alone (300). D: "Terrific! He'll have 
them on their feet. I can hear it from here." Then there is heard a "distant storm of 
applause. P raises his head, fixes the audience. The applause falters, dies. Long 
pause. Fade-out of light on face" (301). 
Emmanuel Lévinas: "The face resists possession, resists my powers. In 
its epiphany, in expression, the sensible, still graspable, turns into total resistance 
to the grasp" (77, 197). He also states, a couple of pages later, that "Infinity 
presents itself as a face in the ethical resistance that paralyses my powers and from 
the depths of defenceless eyes rises firm and absolute in its nudity and destitution." 
(77 199-200). It is interesting that the Director calls for more nudity—meaning 
here the body, rather than the face—perhaps as a sign of the abjection and 
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obj edification of the Protagonist. The applause indicates a complicity on the part 
of the audience and the Director—but it is silenced once the aural double of the 
actual audience is confronted by the face of the Other. It is significant that for 
Lévinas, while the Other for whom one is placed in a position of infinite 
responsibility may be designated as the orphan, the widow, the homeless one, she 
is also perceived as being above oneself, signifying from a height this infinite 
responsibility that for Lévinas witnesses to the idea of God. God for Lévinas is the 
opposite of what God is for Hegel, or Being for Heidegger, not total, or totalizing, 
but infinite, infinitely out of reach, but also infinitely demanding our responsibility 
for the Other. The height is seen clearly in Catastrophe in the pedestal which raises 
the Protagonist to the line of sight of people in the front row of the stalls. While 
the Director conceives that Abjection raised to a height where all can see is enough 
to bring the audience to its feet, as if in triumph over the Other, all that is needed 
is for the Protagonist to raise his face and fix the audience with his glance to 
compel them to recognize their responsibility, convict them of their culpability.9 
Lévinas points out that there is "an essential poverty in the face; the proof of this 
is that one tries to mask this poverty by putting on poses, by taking on a 
countenance. The face is exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to an act of violence." 
At the same time "the face is what forbids us to kill" (77, 85-86 ). John Llewelyn 
comments on this: "The lesson taught by the indiscrete face of the Other is 'Thou 
shalt not kill,' where killing is to be understood in its widest sense as the ethically 
impossible suppression of the Other's alterity, the reduction of the Other to the 
same" (Llewelyn 97). The indiscrete face refutes sameness, the sameness that is 
indicated by the desire to hide the face, to whiten the cranium in order to connect 
it more firmly to the body, removing its distinctive expression.10 
While Catastrophe starkly projects Lévinas's ethic of the face-to-face 
encounter and its effects, can we ask whether performance in general can be 
interpreted according to this schema? What is the face to face in performance? 
Clearly, the vast majority of performance historically and cross-culturally has 
presented itself to the audience in an attitude of facing, a presentational attitude; 
one can see this in Asian performance and most Western performance up until the 
age of naturalist theater. Does this imply that the non-facing of naturalist fourth-
wall acting is somehow unethical? Or is this non-facing symptomatic of a modern 
milieu in which the face to face is less possible than before? One reason why 
Brecht may be important for modern theater is the way in which the display of the 
theatrical apparatus—its face—is ethically entwined with the démystification of 
social roles enforced by the dominant culture. One of the most important insights 
from Lévinas may be that the face-to-face relation in the performance situation 
Spring 1999 13 
does develop itself non-reciproeally. The performers may be there for the Other 
(the audience) and the spectators may be there for the Other (the performers), but 
what is given and received is never fully unified in reciprocation, no matter if this 
is the desire of the audience or of the performers. Gertrude Stein complained about 
this non-reciprocity in temporal terms by referring to the fact that the actors were 
always ahead of the audience as "syncopation." In its place she would try to 
establish a "continuous present," in which all participate at the same rate and within 
the same cognitive space; in this way she understood the play as a "landscape."11 
What is necessary for this continuous present to take place, however, is an ideal 
eradication of an audience's desire for meaning and their anticipation of events 
based on signs in the present. What Stein's problem clarifies is the degree to which 
a desire for unity is the driving force of performance itself whether in a teleological 
sense, or in her own non-teleological conceptualization. It is her desire to try to 
establish this unity within experience at every moment, in contrast to the pleasures 
others derive from the unity deferred until the proper climactic moment, when all 
falls together, on stage and in the spectator's mind. In either case, the desire for 
this unity of experience only compels the audience or performer to give more to 
the Other if they are to remain attended to or identified with. 
What about the audience's relation to the Other as 
performer/performance? Is the face involved here literally the face of the 
performer, or is it indicated in the very architectural relation? That is, isn't the 
proscenium a face, an interface, isn't the stage the face of the Other compelling our 
attention? Aren't the actors the very expression of that face as a whole? (Here one 
can start asking about the shapes of performance spaces, and whether they allow 
the facings I can speak of here with the proscenium: the thrust stage, the theater 
in the round and other configurations, some that confront the audience with itself.) 
Furthermore, couldn't the nakedness of this face be the "empty space" Peter 
Brook speaks of? Couldn't it be the impoverished space that Grotowski spoke of? 
One need only recall the set of Endgame as the interior of a skull to understand this 
problem, or Ibsen' s sets—the revealed/concealed back rooms in Hedda Gabier and 
The Wild Duck. Even the gaping maw of the empty set strewn with garbage of 
Beckett's Breath. 
Just as playwrights like Chekhov, Pinter or Beckett can reveal to us 
through the judicious use of obsessive chatter the immense hollowness and 
emptiness that lies beneath our lives, the shattering silence we continually try to 
avoid, so the appropriate use of the face, with all its expressive possibilities, its 
masks, can reveal to us an intense vulnerable nudity of the face behind such 
displays, a nudity that compels us to recognize an unformalizable and 
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fundamentally problematic aspect of human life. This condition is the condition 
of the Call, the Demand, the True Speech, the Saying and not the Said. It is the 
signifyingness of the face compelling us and not its significations. It is the 
fundamental ethical relation which eludes Lévinas's notion of thematization. In 
this sense it is congruent with Wittgenstein's reflection on his Tractatus as a book 
about ethics, but such a book only insofar as it cannot speak in any direct way 
about it, rather operating apophatically by exhausting all the possibilities that can 
speak directly about the referential functionings of language. 
Now consider a work that foregrounds the theatrical site itself as "face." 
Ntozake Shange's two acts in her play Spell #7 are introduced and framed by a 
gigantic blackface mask hanging from the ceiling, raised at the beginning and 
lowered at the end of each act.12 The audience enters with it in its lowered position. 
As she puts it in her first stage instructions: "In a way the show has already begun, 
for the members of the audience must integrate this grotesque, larger-than-life 
misrepresentation of life into their preshow chatter, slowly the house lights fade, 
but the mask looms even larger in the darkness." She goes on: "once the mask is 
all that can be seen, LOU, the magician enters" whereupon he tells the story of his 
father, a magician, who was asked by Lou's childhood friend to make him white 
(608). Lou's father reprimands him and instead claims that "you'll be colored and 
love it." At this point the actors in the cast, all wearing black-face masks like the 
gigantic hanging one, go through a series of dances and other performance 
routines developed throughout African American history, until, 
LOU walks through the black-faced figures in their kneeling 
poses, arms outstretched as if they were going to sing 'mammy. ' 
He speaks now [as a companion to the mask] to the same 
audience who fell so easily into his hands and who were so 
aroused by the way the black-faced figures 'sang n danced.' 
He calls one of the figures forward to speak: uthe black-faced ALEC gives his 
minstrel mask to LOU when he hears his name. ALEC rises, the rest of the 
company is intimidated by this figure daring to talk without the protection of black-
face. they move away from him or move in place as if in mourning" (609). 
Alec recounts his coming of age in St. Louis, and of everything that city 
contributed to African-American culture. He is then confronted by an angry white 
mob. He says, "do not be seen in yr hometown/after sunset/we suck up our 
shadows." This statement moves the others to remove their masks, leaving them 
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"with their true faces bared to the audience"" One of the figures, Dahlia, removes 
her "hideous overalls & picaninny-buckwheat wig, to reveal a finely laced 
unitard/the body of a modern dancer" which allows her to dance a "lyrical but 
pained solo." Once she's finished, with Alec following her offstage, Lou speaks 
to the audience: "why dontchu go on & live my life for me/ i didnt want certain 
moments at all/i'd give them to anybody." At this point Lou "waves his hand 
commanding the minstrel mask to disappear, which it does" (610). 
Thus begins the scene in Eli's bar, the haven for the black actors who 
relate how they are compelled by white agencies to play only roles that are racially 
stereotyped, and in bitter contrast, to relate fantasies about other characters, other 
black women: one who lives the high life, one who spends all her time brushing her 
long hair, and one, narrated by Natalie, who gives birth to a child named "myself," 
only to kill it when it has learned to crawl away from her. Alec responds: "& she 
forgot abt the child bein born/&waz heavy & full all her life/with 'myself,'" to 
which Natalie replies: "who'll be out/any day now." Lou comments on these 
ambiguous phrases that while relating to the pain of real birth, indicate a subtext 
of never being able to truly give birth to yourself in a world where that self is 
always immediately stolen from you: "aint that a goddamn shame/ aint that a way 
to come into the world sometimes I really cant write sometimes I cant even talk" 
(616). This speech signals the end of Act One with the descent of the Minstrel 
Mask, which remains lit throughout intermission. 
Act Two begins with Lou commanding the Mask to disappear once more. 
This act is accompanied by various kinds of music arising from African forms, 
framing a cosmopolitan depiction of black people in international settings, outside 
the areas restricted by white American culture. Manifested there are the styles and 
moves of romance between black men and women. But then the theatrical spell is 
broken through the tensions that force the boundaries between acting and living to 
collapse. Dahlia says to Lou: "it's just I don't know you/except as the character 
i'm sposed to love/& well I know rehearsal is over/but i'm still in love with you" 
(619-620). Arguments between other couples break out once the frustrations about 
acting jobs return to the fore. In a historical overview, Alec expresses the rage of 
his desire to see whites apologize for the past treatment of African-Americans 
(620). Natalie puts on the persona of a white woman to act out what her possible 
relation to women of color might be, indicting an oblivious white feminism along 
the way, then working up into a sardonic rage over Emmett Till's lynching on a 
charge of raping a white woman (621-622). Maxine works through a memory of 
safety from polio and other diseases because black girls were never used as poster-
children for these diseases. Social exclusion seemed to feed a conclusion that only 
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whites were sick or mean: "I found out that the colored folks knew abt the same 
vicious & disease-ridden passions that the white folks knew" (622-623). 
The entire play ends with a speech by Lou: 
crackers are born with the right to be 
alive/i'm making ours up right here 
in yr face/and we gonna be 
colored & love it. 
{the huge minstrel mask comes down as company continues to 
sing 'colored & love it/love it being colored. ' blackout/but the 
minstrel mask remains visible, the company is singing 'colored 
& love it being colored' as audience exits). (623) 
Now while there's much that can be said about what's going in this play, 
given the two theories I've discussed, I'm mainly interested in the business of the 
Mask/Face as Shange represents it. Think about the sequence of actions that 
precede and follow the raising and lowering of the Mask. The Mask is there from 
the beginning, providing a safety zone for the spectator and actor. It frames the 
smaller proscenia—the blackface masks that each performer wears. While Alec 
must tell his personal story only after bravely removing his mask, the ever-present 
threat of white mobs indicate that the mask in itself won't protect anyone, so the 
others remove theirs. Dropping the paradoxically imposed mask of defense frees 
the creative spirit, so that Dahlia can be in her body fully and dance past the rigid 
boundaries of how dance is defined in terms of black and white. Once Lou 
himself can cast aside his own protective attitude and say "go on and live my life 
for me," the Mask, the barrier between spectator and actor, disappears. It is only 
when Lou the poet as well as magician can no longer speak, after the forlorn story 
of "myself," who is always but never being born, does the mask descend again; the 
assumption of an imposed role seems better than the raw and naked state of none 
at all. Yet in Lévinas's terms, it is precisely when one is at a loss for words that the 
face's true call to responsibility occurs. In Act Two the Mask disappears to reveal 
the real variety and richness of black cultural life. But even this apparently more 
authentic realm of social fantasy breaks down. What returns are all the moral 
ambiguities of lived black experience, painful self-truths. The Mask descends for 
the last time as Lou exclaims "i'm making up [our right to be] right here in yr 
face/and we gonna be colored and love it." There is a lingering ambiguity even 
here: by "yr face," does he mean the face of the spectator or the hanging Mask? 
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Or are the two to be identified with each other? The Mask is in fact that of the 
spectator: the projection returns to the projector. 
The blackface Mask serves as the face of the proscenium, raised and 
lowered as curtain, always operating as a frame through which and against which 
we see the faces of the actors, even as they approach us with naked faces and 
confidences, their reactions to having constantly "play the black" while ever 
confronted with the coercive ideal of a white image. Isn't it here that we can point 
to Deleuze and Guattari's theory of faciality as subjection? While this minstrel 
mask/face certainly isn't the White Man's face, it is a caricatural overcoding of 
how the White Man wishes to see Black People. As a face—rather, as a mask 
whose purpose is to overcode the face—it isn't designed to assimilate the black to 
the white man's facial regime. Its significations point not in a human direction, but 
for the white, in an inhuman direction (which, ironically enough, is the appropriate 
direction for the "primitive" mask for Deleuze & Guattari). As a mask it certainly 
connects the head to the body. The fact that the actors do a dance history while 
wearing them indicates to what degree this happens, and why Shange indulges in 
sarcasm in referring to how the audience was aroused by the way the actors "sang 
n danced." For Deleuze and Guattari isn't this exemplary of the body being 
facialized by the mask as well? 
Eric Lott has remarked that "the blackface image . . . constituted black 
people as the focus of the white political Imaginary."13 As such, the image 
operated as a property-form of white male privilege that allowed for, at once, 
indulgence in, and perhaps identification with, a fantasy image of black sexuality, 
and a containment of its threat to a "superior" white se If-identity. For the white 
spectator, the mask made allowances for the obvious presence of blacks within 
American life, while withholding the possibility of their full human participation 
in it. Ralph Ellison addresses this function of concealment in plain sight: "[I]ts 
function was to veil the humanity of Negroes thus reduced to a sign, and to repress 
the white audiences's awareness of its moral identification with its own acts and 
with the human ambiguities pushed behind the mask."14 These ambiguities, 
identification with which strikes a moral chord within us, can only make an 
identificatory claim upon us once the mask is removed, the mask we put there in 
the first place: in other words, our own projections, our cast-off senses of self, our 
own inhumanities. 
While what is of paramount importance in the play is the contrast between 
the mask as cultural overcoding that prevents the face-to-face relation and the 
stripping away of masks, as is indicated by the dramatic move of Alec to speak 
without one, Shange never permanently removes the mask. It is there as a constant 
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framework for perceiving the double bind African-Americans are in respecting 
self-representation within White America, and which, to my mind, negates the 
strategies by which Deleuze and Guattari think representation can be evaded. At 
the end Lou claims that he is "making up [our right to be alive] right here in yr 
face/ and we gonna be colored and love it." The play ends with the lowered and 
illuminated minstrel mask while in the darkness the cast continues to sing "colored 
and love it." The question becomes: do you love the mask? or can you love being 
colored beyond the framework of this mask? We had seen actors producing the 
nakedness of their own faces, in contrast to the wearing of the mask, which they 
began with. As Lévinas points out, it is the nakedness of the face that provokes 
responsibility in us. Yet the play shows that the nakedness is not a given—that the 
social construction, the particular group representation of the face as mask is 
always there to create the contrastive nudity which appears not immediately 
accessible to culturally conditioned Others. Aren't we seeing how racial features 
disrupt the universal face-to-face relation? But do they? And through what 
agency? For Lévinas it is the prèsignifying "signifyingness" of the human face that 
calls to us, not its already socially overcoded significations. In other words, there 
has to be something in the human face that calls to us, whatever our racial 
demarcations, through those overcoded significations in order for Shange's play 
to make any sense in its attempted disruption of those codes. But as the reactions 
of the other actors to Alec also indicates, the mask can be a form of protection as 
well as a despotic overcoding. Ellison notes this ambiguity of the mask as well: 
"We wear the mask for purposes of aggression as well as for defense, when we are 
projecting the future and preserving the past. In short, the motives hidden behind 
the mask are as numerous as the ambiguities the mask conceals" (109). 
In Deleuze and Guattari's terms do we witness at all the destruction or 
dismantling of the face? They themselves had indicated that the risk is madness, 
and that instead one should "find your black holes and white walls, know them, 
know your faces; it is only way you will be able to dismantle them and draw your 
lines of flight" (188). The actors are here locked into a paradoxical relation to 
history—the desire to both remember the forms of oppression that created the 
situation of identity in the present as well as the desire to evade the cultural 
constructions that the history of white hegemony had imposed on them. Can they 
with confidence, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, simply run [across the wall of the 
signifer] lines of asignifiance that void all memory, all return, all possible 
signification and interpretation" (189) without voiding their own humanity at the 
same time? (Although, admittedly, questions of humanity for Deleuze and Guattari 
hardly seem a concern.) 
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In the working out of their theories Deleuze and Guattari have little to say 
about the performative situation, even while two of their emblematic figures are 
men of the theater—Kleist and Artaud. Kleist's play Penthisilea is read for its 
content ("becoming-woman," "becoming-animal") like any work of prose fiction, 
and Artaud is read almost entirely in relation to his biography, with little if any 
attention at all paid to his theater works. Perhaps this evasion or ignoring of 
performance has to do with the degree to which the performance situation cannot 
escape the problems of representation and mimesis (something Artaud was 
certainly concerned about) that they are so reactive against. Lévinas at certain 
points does indicate the theatrical nature of the face-to-face situation; but we have 
to ask him what the nudity of the face means in a theatrical framework. Clearly 
there must be a certain will to confront the face as face, without regard for the 
particularities of its features; Lévinas claims that if you know the color of the 
Other's eyes you are no longer in a social relation to them, but regarding them 
thematically, not as a Thou but an It. Clearly this is applicable to interracial 
relations. Lévinas challenges us to confront the face's signifyingness, the 
conditions of possibility for significations of a new sort. Even if it remains 
overcoded by the old signification, it is the Saying, not the Said, the Call to us and 
not what the Demand is in its particulars, but the Demand itself, that constitutes the 
ethical relation vis à vis the African-American face, as it does with any face. But 
how possible is it to confront the Other in the theater as a Thou, as a naked face, 
as a real appeal to responsibility? Doesn't the theatre automatically thematize the 
Other? Isn't the impulse of any audience to create projections, to give a mask to 
a performer when they seem not to have one? Isn't it safer that way? And can the 
performer ever appear in the theatrical situation without a mask of some sort? Is 
the face of the Protagonist in Beckett's Catastrophe truly naked, or did it only seem 
so, given its fleeting contrastive reaction to the audience's habituation to the bowed 
head? Lévinas himself admits the problem when he states in Otherwise than Being 
that "the enigma of the naked face runs the risk of being ridiculed as but one more 
case of the emperor's clothes" {OB, 152). Within the theatrical context, one might 
want to ask Lévinas if the naked face continues to call to us through the protective 
barrier of the mask. Can the mask indeed be a possible, even if paradoxical, means 
of amplifying that call? While earlier I mentioned that the great majority of world 
theater involves various kinds of face-to-face relation with the audience, I failed to 
note that most of it also includes masking in one form or another. Significantly, a 
volume of Pirandello's plays is called Naked Masks, demonstrating in an apparent 
contradiction the very vulnerability enforced in us by the contingent and illusory 
nature of social roles. It is the imposed, always already masked condition of 
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African-American identity that Shange points to as both the defense mechanism 
and the source of vulnerability in the first place, which is why the naked face never 
seems to escape the framework of its mask. 
Take it one step further in an intrapsychic sense, we might ask whether or 
not Lévinas's positing of self and Other presupposes a unity of self on each side of 
the ethical divide, something that would be contested by Lacanian analysis. But 
Lévinas emphasizes that the self itself is not undivided: "The oneself has to be 
conceived outside of all substantial coinciding of self with self (OB, 114). At the 
same time he doesn't wish to indicate that this presents an insurmountable and 
tragic gap within the self, which would preclude it from responding to the call of 
the Other: "The psyche is the other in the same without alienating the same" (OB, 
114). In other words, the intrapsychic cognitive gap, the psychic proscenium, 
which produces consciousness of self in the first place, can be enabling. At the 
same time, given the relation of unconscious desire to a conscious self-
development that is a constituent part of a social ethos, one could ask whether or 
not masks function even here. Ralph Ellison indicates that they do, as he quotes 
W. B. Yeats to this effect: 
There is a relation between discipline and the theatrical sense. 
If we cannot imagine ourselves as different from what we are 
and assume the second self, we cannot impose a discipline upon 
ourselves, though we may accept one from others. Active virtue, 
as distinct from the passive acceptance of a current code, is the 
wearing of a mask. It is the condition of an arduous full life. 
(107) 
The crux of the matter is in being able to distinguish between self-discipline and 
one that is imposed, active virtue from the passive acceptance of a current code. 
While skeptical to a degree of the ability to locate the naked face beneath the mask 
in performance, since our relations to ourselves also involves the wearing of masks, 
I remain interested in what the possibility of examining what an ethical relation to 
the Other can mean in performance, knowing that the Other can mean racial other, 
sexual other, gender other, and performative other, even as it always points most 
directly to the Other within, something with more exteriority to it than we may 
realize. 
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